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in that. the nature and prOperties of the added, ingredient would .be tested
by reference to the particular ingredient alone, and not in 'its -emperic
context.
This absolute construction of "harmless" has the effect of .establishing
a standard in which the analysis will concentrate on the color per • se,
rather than an examination of the effect of the use of color on the article
itself. •
•That a legal principle, which had reigned from the earliest 'days of
the Food and Dfugs Act, would be modified by Congr6s . withdut the' barest
explanatiOn, that the court would change the test of adulteration' by a
construction based on semantics and not on economic practicalities and
the history of the orange 'economy, and that even tolerances' of "harmful
ingredients" would not be allbwed because of '§ 402(c)ls flat prohibition
against the use of non-certified colors, display once 'again the danger of
being trapped in the',inire of literal ideology, and `not basing a decision' on
a traditional 'rule that stands on the facts of the matter.
.	 • •
EDWARD F. HARRINGTON
Labor Relations—Arbitration—Condition Precedent to, an Action for
Damages for Wrongful Discharge.—Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware.1—
A discharged employee brought an action at law for breach of his employ-
ment contract. He had not submitted his grievance to the ,union within
five days, as provided by the collective bargaining agreement. He alleged
that his discharge violated terms of the collective bargaining. agreement
which were . incorporated into his employment contract. Judgment was
rendered 'for the plaintiff. On appeal, affirmed; primary resort to grievance
procedure is unnecessary. where the employee elects to consider his dis-
charge as final and he seeks damages rather than reinstatement.
Courts are divided' on the question whether exhaustion of grievance
machinery is a condition precedent to an action at law in discharge cases.
At common law contracts to arbitrate were revocabIe. 2 Seemingly, courts
which do not require exhaustion of grievance procedures are , perpetuating
this common law rule in the field of labor relations. 8 Other courts have
adopted the view that public policy favors the arbitration device and there-
fore, where the right to damages for wrongful discharge is dependent upon
a collective bargaining agreement, contractual remedies must be exhausted
before judicial remedies will be available' Under the latter view judicial
relief is available, however, when the union is hostile to the claim of an
261 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir., 1958). The case had been removed from the Alabama
courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship.
2 Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 160
(1934).
Lammond v. Aleo Manufacturing Co., 243 N.C. 749, 92 S.E.2d 143 (1956).
• Jorgenson v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 25 N.J. 541, 138 A.2d 24 (1958) ; Payne v.
Pullman Co., 13 Ill. App, 2d 105; 141 N.E.2d 83 (1957); Williams v. Pacific Electric
R.R. Co., 147 Cal. App. 2d 1, 304 P.2d 715 (App. Div. 2d D 1956).
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aggrieved employee, since the employee is unable to prosecute his own .
claim under the usual collective bargaining agreement . 5
While no
	 decisions have been found in direct conflict with that
of the principal case; yet dictum in Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood,8
 not
cited in the principal case, indicates that the Alabama courts would require
exhaustion of the grievance procedure. It seems unfortunate that the
federal court did not follow that decision.' It is submitted that union secu-
rity- is promoted by requiring. union ' to process their grievances
through the union;i and, that this security generally leads to better union-
company relations. The danger of a union's arbitrarily refusing to process ,
grievances is minimized by dispensing with the requirement when the union
is hostile to the employee's claims.
CHARLES C. WINCHESTER; 'JR.'
Landlord and Tenant—Payment of Increased Taxes on Lessee's Im-
provements—Do-ctrine 'of 'Waste—Tbe Crew Corp. v. Feiler.'=The
plaintiff leased premises for a term of fifteen years with an option to buy
in the lessee. By the terms of the lease, the lessor agreed to ' pay municipal
real estate taxes. There was no express provision authorizing the leSsee
to' 'make 'alterations or iinProvementS. Scion 'after the execution of the lease,
the lessee made certain improvements to the building, changing its charac:
teristics from an industrial to an office building, as a result of which' the
valuation of the property was increased, resulting in increased taxes in
the amount of $2,700. The .lessor brought suit against the lessee to recover
the amount:paid' in increased taxes. The Trial Court granted summary
judgment fOr the lessee. The Appellate biVision of the Superior Court
affirmed and on appeal the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and re-
manded. HELD: That while the parties are free to make whatever agree-
ment they please, ad'Unqualified covenant to pay real estate taxes means
that the covenantor is required to make tax payments based on (1) the
value of the leased premises as they existed at the time of the Tease, and
(2) such increases in value as reflect improvement made by the lessee under
the authority of the lease or authority of law. Since as a matter of con-
struction the improvements were not authorized by the lease, the question
was whether they were authorized by law. In answering this question in
the negative the court found that the lessee's acts constituted waste and,
therefore, were not performed under authority of law.
• In reaching its decision, the first problem with which the court was
faced was to ascertain the intent of the parties through a construction of
the covenant to pay taxes. In this respect where the lease is silent as to
5 Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood, 266 Ala. 194, 95 So.2d 98 (1957) ; Jorgenson v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra note 4; Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495,
82 N.W.2d 172 (1957); United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194
F.2d 997, 1002 (7th Cir., 1952).
6 266 Ala. 194, 95 So.2d 98 (1957).
1 28 N,J. 316, 146 A.2d 458 (1958).
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